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Beyond Mere Competence 
A. Leo Levin* 
Professors Gee and Jackson have given us a comprehensive 
overview of the major issues confronting legal education today. In 
addition, they have provided historical and comparative perspec- 
tives, impressive arrays of information in many areas, and unique 
insights and analyses throughout. 
It is hard to dissent from their judgment that legal educators, 
like lawyers generally, tend to accept change with something less 
than marked alacrity and wild enthusiasm. Instead, legal educa- 
tors customarily view proposals for change with a firm conviction 
that the burden of proof rests with those who would alter the 
status quo. Despite the apparent resistance to change, the 
perspective of history may reveal that legal education has under- 
gone greater change during the past two decades than those who 
would move more rapidly appreciate. Clinical education has been 
accepted as a major force in most law schools, thanks in large 
measure to the thinking and funding of the Council on Legal 
Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR). Local rules 
permitting student practice have been adopted in both state and 
federal courts. Law school class electives and alternative educa- 
tional programs have proliferated, even though no one program 
has gained acceptance on a national scale. Indeed, the vast in- 
crease in the number of young men and women seeking a legal 
education is itself a significant external change having a marked 
impact on the quality of legal education obtained in law school 
classrooms and corridors. The fact that external stimuli rather 
than decisions made within the law schools are primarily respon- 
sible for change does not alter the event nor diminish its signifi- 
cance. 
Although past years have seen changes, many issues, which 
distinguished observers expected to have been resolved by now, 
remain yet undetermined.' That so many questions remain unan- 
swered may indicate that, however great the need for improve- 
ment with regard to specifics, legal education is still fulfilling its 
- - -  - - 
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1. E.g., Gorman, Proposals for Reform of Legal Education, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 
847-48 (1971) (discussing the issue of interdisciplinary study). 
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basic mission in a fashion acceptable to the great majority of 
lawyers, judges, and law teachers. It is therefore unlikely that any 
single, uniform proposal for reform will be embraced by the legal 
profession as a whole. Legal education will probably continue to 
develop much like the common law. Developments will remain 
interstitial and incremental, the significance of each step being 
appreciated only as one surveys the cumulative effect of a large 
number of small steps. Concerns of faculty members, strictures 
on financial resources, and other factors noted by Professors Gee 
and Jackson will inevitably continue to play important roles. 
To continue the common law analogy, we should recognize 
that legal educators, like common law judges, must necessarily 
determine long-range goals in charting a course of the future. 
Professors Gee and Jackson report that today the "magic elixir" 
is competence. Holmes, almost a century ago, addressed the 
question of what was the proper "business of law schools," and 
his emphasis was rather different than the prevailing view re- 
ported by Gee and Jackson. In an "oration" delivered in 1886, 
Holmes said: 
Education, other than self-education, lies mainly in the 
shaping of men's interests and aims. If you convince a man that 
another way of looking at  things is more profound, another form 
of pleasure more subtile than that to which he has been accus- 
tomed-if you make him really see it-the very nature of man 
is such that he will desire the profounder thought and the sub- 
tiler joy. So I say the business of a law school is not sufficiently 
described when you merely say that it is to teach law, or to make 
lawyers. It is to teach law in the grand manner, and to make 
great l a ~ y e r s . ~  
Education in the "grand manner" must certainly include compe- 
tence, and-I should like to suggest-competence properly under- 
stood may well be best achieved by education that at  least ap- 
proaches the grand manner. 
Gee and Jackson's figure of speech, referring to competence 
as the "magic elixir," is apt. Like other forms of magic, however, 
competence is a term difficult to define. Indeed, as the authors 
themselves readily acknowledge, competence is not always easy 
to recognize even when observed. Difficulties of definition and 
recognition aside, i t  is nevertheless important not to aim for too 
low a level of competence. The legal profession should not be 
2 .  O.W. HOLMES, The Use of Law Schools, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 35, 37 (1920) 
(oration before the Harvard Law School Association (Nov. 5, 1886)). 
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satisfied with minimum competence as a goal, particularly if 
greater competence is attainable without excessive incremental 
costs. Moreover, society is entitled to expect more of its lawyers 
than a rudimentary ability to manipulate doctrines, interpret 
precedents, and draft enforceable agreements. It is not wise to 
assume that we should expect less of lawyers choosing to practice 
in small towns instead of urban centers, or in neighborhood set- 
tings rather than financial districts. 
Education in the "grand manner" should do more than en- 
rich the lawyer's life with appreciation of subtleties and dimen- 
sions otherwise ignored. Education in the grand manner serves its 
purpose fully if it enriches the lawyer's capacity to serve his 
clients, improve his profession, and elevate the life of the law. 
There may be something to be gained from considering for a 
moment the goal of law teaching and the methods by which we 
strive to meet it. On that basis, we can explore-by way of exam- 
ple-legal education's potential for enabling lawyers (1) to see 
ethical problems in litigation that they might otherwise not see; 
(2) to see ethical problems in the legal system that they have an 
obligation to help weed out; and (3) to comprehend the body of 
the law as a living thing rather than a static set of doctrine. 
Finally, we can examine how education in the grand manner may 
be furthered by developing the capacity in the system to blend 
the rich perspectives of the academician, the practitioner, and 
the judge in an effective teaching setting. 
We begin by considering ethical problems in litigation that 
law students might otherwise ignore. Gee and Jackson underscore 
the importance of professional responsibility when they state that 
lawyers should be "profoundly aware of ethical questions and 
 standard^."^ To be profound, knowledge or awareness must re- 
flect a personal understanding that  affects one's professional 
judgment and actions in a continuous and powerful way. Teach- 
ing this awareness is an exceedingly difficult task. Perhaps even 
more difficult is measuring whether we have been successful in 
our efforts. Serious practical and theoretical problems are en- 
countered in the attempt to evaluate how and to what extent legal 
education teaches this profound awareness of ethical questions 
and standards. A consideration of how law schools approach the 
teaching and examination of legal rules and doctrines may reveal 
the fact that where legal education has been deficient in teaching 
3. Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 
B.Y.1J.L. REV. 963. 
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profound ethical awareness, the students of that education may 
be among those least able to sense the deficiencies. 
Probably no single major premise of legal education is more 
familiar to law students and their professors than the proposition 
that rules of law have not been "learned," let alone mastered, 
until they can be applied to concrete fact situations. Indeed, we 
typically test for mastery of doctrine, not by asking about the 
doctrine directly, but rather by posing a fact situation in which 
the doctrine is relevant. In legal education we stress issue identifi- 
cation because we consider it relatively useless to know a rule 
without being able to recognize situations where the rule is rele- 
vant. If a lawyer cannot recognize an issue, it will do him no good 
to know the governing rule. On the other hand, if he can see the 
question, it is usually possible, with a little time and effort, to 
discover the state of the authorities that may or may not provide 
an "answer." Thus it is not unusual to see the weak student 
emerge from an examination rather less troubled than his more 
knowledgeable classmate, simply because the latter has grappled 
hard with problems of which the former was oblivious. 
This phenomenon can be analogized to the pitfalls of relying 
too heavily on data forms or questionnaires addressed to lawyers, 
asking whether and in what ways they were or were not equipped 
by their legal education for the practice of law. To the extent that 
lawyers report perceived deficiencies in their education, the data 
are valuable. However, to the extent respondents report no per- 
ceived deficiencies in their education, the data may tell us rela- 
tively little. To put the matter another way, one who is totally 
unaware of the role of vitamins in a well-balanced diet can hardly 
be expected to report a vitamin deficiency regardless of the state 
of his diet or health. Therefore, because of the great possibility 
that attorneys will not perceive a lack of those qualities or 
skills-some related to ethics and others not-of which they are 
in greatest need, it is important to avoid placing undue reliance 
on surveys of attorneys4 who report no perceived deficiencies. 
While it is uncertain whether these various deficiencies are 
best remedied by undergraduate legal education or by some other 
means, it is apparent that legal education should do more to 
sensitize future lawyers to problems and issues of which they 
might otherwise remain oblivious. Indeed, if legal education 
should fail to meet this challenge, law school graduates, not per- 
ceiving the educational failure, will be unable to identify deficien- 
4. Primarily that survey data cited in id. at  927-63 (Section VII). 
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cies when responding to questions concerning the success or fail- 
ure of the law school in giving them the tools with which to 
successfully practice law. A vicious cycle is thus identified: The 
deficiency that is never recognized as such will likely remain 
unremedied. Whereas a lack of substantive knowledge or inade- 
quate skill in draftsmanship hopefully will be perceived and cor- 
rected, what remedial action can be expected when the deficiency 
itself is failure to perceive the need for remedial action? 
In the area of ethics, for example, legal education has a vital 
role to play in breaking this vicious cycle. I t  was, a t  least until 
recently, common for legal educators to ignore ethical problems, 
finding it fashionable to assert that  fundamental traits of charac- 
ter are unlikely to be changed by anything the law schools can 
do with respect to ethics or professional responsibility. Perhaps 
this is partially true. But there remains a clear role for legal 
education a t  least to identify situations involving issues of ethics 
and professional responsibility that require character judgments. 
Let us turn to specific examples. Litigation tactics have long 
been a fertile source of difficult and frequently subtle problems 
of ethics and professional responsibility. Some behavior is clearly 
unethical and thus, by definition, removed from the arena of 
tactics and neatly labelled as unprofessional conduct, unworthy 
of any self-respecting advocate. Further along the spectrum are 
any number of situations in which attorneys must draw that fine 
line between a legitimate tactic and unethical behavior. 
The tactical use and abuse of discovery provide a prime ex- 
ample. It has long been suggested that some attorneys use the 
taking of depositions as an opportunity to multiply the expenses 
of an opposing party, hoping thereby to obtain a more favorable 
posture for settlement. In fact, there is evidence that the cost of 
litigation has become so oppressive that many would-be litigants 
are denied effective access to the courts. As a result, the entire 
process of discovery is currently being reexamined with a view 
toward significant irnpro~ement.~ Yet, regardless of future defini- 
tional and structural changes, it is of critical importance that 
attorneys who unscrupulously exploit the discovery process 
should have been taught to recognize the ethical problems pre- 
sented by resort to such tactics. 
5. E.g. ,  American Bar Association, Report of Pound Conference Follow-up Task 
Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 191-92 (1976). Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit recently announced appointment of a special circuit com- 
mission to study reducing litigation costs. Federal Courts Act to Improve Accessibility, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1977, B 1, at 61, col. 7. 
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I am confident that if the problems are identified as ethical 
issues, the bar will generally rise to the perceived need and will 
identify the circumstances under which burdens of discovery 
imposed on the opponent cross the line from the permissible to 
the forbidden. If the problem is never identified as such, it is 
difficult to feel any measure of confidence that solutions will be 
proposed, let alone accepted. Although this problem has been 
ignored for too many years, it is an area where legal education 
definitely has a role to play in sensitizing our future lawyers. 
Let us next turn to a distinct but related problem, that of the 
attorney's obligation not only to avoid impropriety himself but 
also to contribute, as a member of a learned profession, to the 
improvement of the system as a whole. The problem of the so- 
called "sewer service" of process provides an example. A little 
over a decade ago it became obvious that in a number of urban 
centers the rights of certain minorities, and of poor people gener- 
ally, were being violated in massive numbers by the filing of false 
returns of service. To borrow a figure of speech, process servers 
were dumping legal papers into the sewers of the cities, filing false 
returns, and relying on execution process, usually by way of gar- 
nishment, to inform the named defendants that default judg- 
ments had already been entered against them. 
Though remedial action was ultimately taken on a number 
of levels, including prosecution for violation of federal laws, the 
primary question was and is whether the organized bar had then 
and continues now to have responsibility for cleaning out what 
may be termed little cesspools on the periphery of the profession. 
Is it the obligation of a member of the bar, or of the organized 
bar, to assume the initiative for eliminating such abuses? To its 
credit, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York did 
indeed feel such an obligation and consequently focused on the 
difficulties through special committee reports and other organ- 
ized activities. 
This type of situation should be grist for the law school mill. 
In typical Socratic fashion, a series of hypothetical probings could 
.be conducted. For example, what is the propriety of using process 
servers engaged in such odious practices if, at  the request of a 
particular attorney, they would give the attorney or his law firm 
involved in the litigation every assurance of properly serving each 
and every summons? Moreover, what is the obligation of an attor- 
ney who is not involved in litigation a t  all? Does such an attorney, 
as a member of the bar, owe any particular obligation to improve 
the level of the profession? 
Even though Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsi- 
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bility mandates that "[a] lawyer should assist in improving the 
legal system," these precatory words hardly provide a definitive 
answer. While the Canon is relevant to the inquiry, it says too 
little or proves too much. This is an area with which education 
in the grand manner should deal, if only to sensitize future mem- 
bers of the bar to the potential obligations inherent in member- 
ship in a learned profession. Once again, if the law schools do not 
accomplish this much, is there not the risk that the very problem 
will go unnoticed? 
We next turn to yet another instance where, without sacrifice 
of basics, legal education should attempt to develop a law stu- 
dent's potential to its fullest. The truly competent lawyer should 
be able to comprehend the body of the law as a living thing rather 
than a static set of doctrine. Knowledge of existing substantive 
law is always valuable; yet, proper legal training should include 
the ability also to contribute to the development of the law. 
Therefore, a sensitivity to the weaknesses and infirmities of long- 
established doctrines may be more important than a knowledge 
of the substance of such doctrines. This is aptly illustrated by a 
recent United States Supreme Court decision in Shaffer v. 
Heitner,' rendering obsolete a vast amount of received learning 
in the area of quasi in rem jurisdiction. The decision was not the 
coup de grace administered to a doctrine already riddled with 
exceptions by lower courts. On the contrary, although there were 
a few lower court opinions inviting reconsideration of the major 
premises of quasi in rem jurisdiction, there was no clear fore- 
shadowing of what may properly be termed a basic change. 
The successful practitioner, like the prevailing attorney in 
Shaffer, is one who has been educated to question accepted doc- 
trines and to be sensitive to the vulnerability of received learning. 
Legal education can contribute significantly to the development 
of these qualities of mind if we do not either dilute the definition 
of competence or aim so low in defining the goals of legal educa- 
tion that we ignore such training. Indeed, this dimension of legal 
education can and should be emphasized in both practice- and 
theory-oriented law school classes. 
It bears repetition that sensitivity to questions of ethics and 
professional responsibility and to the weaknesses and infirmities 
of substantive law should be of concern to solo practitioners as 
well as to partners in large firms, to lawyers in small towns and 
rural communities as well as to lawyers in urban centers. Indeed, 
6. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
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optimum legal reform cannot be achieved without considering the 
different and valuable perspectives of small-town practitioners. 
Professor Walter Gellhorn has put it even more broadly in an 
observation applicable not only to the development of the sub- 
stantive law, but to the entire range of professional practice. "A 
law student," he wrote, "needs curiosity, not simply about the 
immediately relevant, but about the seemingly 'impractical' as 
well. A law student is training, after all, not to meet the demands 
of the moment at  hand or already in sight, but for work whose 
contours can only be guessed at."7 
Typically it is easier to define goals than to prescribe how to 
achieve them. What sufficed for education in the grand manner 
when Holmes wrote can hardly suffice today. Fortunately, our 
processes are changing. The burgeoning of clinical education has 
been widely noted. Perhaps less widely noted is the fact that these 
programs frequently serve to forge a partnership in education 
between practitioner and academician. This union is a healthy 
development. There is advantage to bringing together those 
whose focus is on theory and those whose focus is on the needs of 
clients. The sitting judge also has much to offer. He is uniquely 
qualified to lend a sense of reality to proceedings in a classroom 
intended to simulate proceedings in a court. If he rules as he 
would rule in his court, if he acts as he would act in his court, 
the relevant question is not whether he has ruled correctly, but 
rather whether the student has been given a taste of reality and 
can learn to cope, not with a textbook answer, but with what he 
might well expect in real life. 
The potential, however, does not end with role playing or 
with the development of the skills of the practicing lawyer in the 
educational context. Thoughtful judges, trial and appellate, can 
provide a fresh and enriching perspective to traditional discus- 
sions of theory. Whether the subject is the desirability of compul- 
sory psychiatric examination of certain witnesses, the wisdom of 
pretrial settlement procedures, or the advisability of proposed 
changes in the substantive law, one who spends his professional 
life on the bench or in representing clients with particular needs 
and interests has much to offer. I t  would be good to see a greater 
willingness on the part of academicians to reach out and to in- 
volve both judges and practicing lawyers in strictly academic 
aspects of legal education, thus enriching the experience for all 
concerned. No doubt a seminar setting is more conducive to such 
- - 
7 .  Gellhorn, Preaching That Old Time Religion, 63 VA. L. REV. 175, 183-84 (1977). 
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efforts than is the traditional classroom. The point, however, 
remains. 
By the same token, professors have a great deal to offer the 
organized bar as it deals with topics as diverse as the operation 
of small claims courts, alternative mechanisms for dispute resolu- 
tion, reform of grand jury procedures, or the refinement of no- 
fault statutes. Perhaps it has always been that way, although 
many would deny it. It is beyond cavil, however, that today there 
is a genuine contribution which professors are making and which 
should be encouraged, and, indeed, expanded. Happily, there is 
strong evidence that the organized bar is receptive to that contri- 
bution. Continued interchange between these complementary 
divisions of the legal profession will inevitably have a beneficent 
effect on legal education. 
I t  is appropriate to conclude by recording yet another contri- 
bution of Professors Gee and Jackson. They have focused our 
attention on the process of change. Their valuable work invites 
reexamination of the status quo and thoughtful consideration of 
alternatives. While change is not rapid, and should not be, there 
is a sense of motion in legal education. The multiplicity and 
diversity of radical change currently on the agenda serves as a 
denial of complacency and an affirmation of a willingness to reex- 
amine. Given that much, one can expect improvements in the 
decade ahead. 
